Casinos, Crime, and Community Costs by Earl L. Grinols & David B. Mustard
CASINOS, CRIME, & COMMUNITY COSTS
Earl L. Grinols,∗ David B. Mustard∗∗
Revised: September 2004
Abstract
We examine the relationship between casinos and crime using county-level data for the
US between 1977 and 1996. Casinos were non-existent outside Nevada before 1978, and
expanded to many other states during our sample period. Most factors that reduce crime
occur before or shortly after a casino opens, while those that increase crime, including
problem and pathological gambling, occur over time. The results suggest that the eﬀect
on crime is low shortly after a casino opens, and grows over time. Roughly 8 percent of
crime in casino counties in 1996 was attributable to casinos, costing the average adult $75
per adult per year.
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Prior to 1978, there were no casinos in the United States outside Nevada. Since 1990, casinos have
expanded to the point where the vast majority of Americans now have relatively easy access to one. This
paper utilizes the natural experiment created by casino openings to examine how casinos aﬀect crime.
There are many reasons why understanding this link is particularly valuable. First, the casino industry
has grown rapidly in the last decade and has become one of the most controversial and inﬂuential
industries. Commercial casino revenues increased 203 percent from $8.7 billion to $26.3 billion between
1990 and 2000. Including Class III American Indian casinos, revenues were $38.8 billion, or $200 per
adult in 2001. Casino industry revenues are comparable to those of the cigarette market, and all forms
of gambling are more than seven times the amount spent on theater tickets.1 From 1982 to 2000, GDP
increased 201 percent while casino revenues increased more than 660 percent. This rapid expansion
generated extensive debate about the impact of casinos on many social, economic, and political issues.2
Second, the casino industry has become a major lobbying presence. Between 1992 and 1997, $100
million was paid in lobbying fees and donations to state legislators (The Wager, 2, 39, 1997.) Concerns
were suﬃciently pronounced that the U.S. Congress established the National Gambling Impact Study
Commission (NGISC) in 1996 to exhaustively study casinos. Its ﬁnal report called for additional research
about the eﬀects of casinos and a moratorium on further expansion.
Third, research suggests that on a national basis casino gambling generates externality costs in the
range of $40 billion annually,3 and crime is one of the biggest components of these social costs.
Last and most important, in spite of the substantial attention devoted to the casino-crime link,
there is a paucity of convincing research about it. Economists have been virtually silent, and studies
from other disciplines typically exhibit many fundamental weaknesses. First, no study has examined the
intertemporal eﬀect of casinos, which we contend is essential to understanding the relationship. Second,
nearly every study used small samples, most frequently Las Vegas, Atlantic City, Reno, and Deadwood
(Albanese, 1985; Lee and Chelius, 1989; Friedman, Hakim and Weinblatt, 1989; Buck, Hakim and
Spiegel, 1991; Chiricos, 1994; Margolis, 1997) or Wisconsin (Thompson, Gazel, and Rickman, 1996a;
2001), or a selection of a handful of casino markets (Albanese, 1999). Four of these studies conclude
that casinos increase crime, two argue that there is no eﬀect, and one maintains that Florida regions
with casinos have lower crime rates than selected Florida tourist cities if visitors are included in the
population base denominator.
Another problem with the existing research is that some studies (Albanese, 1999 and Hsing, 1996)
made conclusions about crime rates without actually examining crime rates. Instead of analyzing of-
fenses, they used arrests, but did not discuss the problems inherent in using arrest rates to infer anything
11997 cigarette sales were $45 billion. 2002 theater ticket and gambling revenues were $9.3 and $68.7 billion.
2Kindt (1994), Grinols (1996), Henriksson (1996), and Grinols & Omorov (1996) discussed a number of these.
3See, for example, Grinols and Mustard (2001), p. 155 and Grinols (2004), p. 170.
1deﬁnitive about crime rates.
A fourth criticism is that most studies are subject to substantial omitted variable bias because
they rarely controlled for variables that aﬀect crime. Margolis (1997), Florida Department of Law
Enforcement (1994), and Florida Sheriﬀs Association (1994) included no control variables. Nearly all of
the other studies control for very few factors.
Fifth, the literature has generally neglected discussing the theoretical links between casinos and
crime, as Miller and Schwartz (1998) document in detail.
Last, many studies were agenda-driven, conducted or funded by either pro-gambling or law enforce-
ment organizations. Nelson, Erickson and Langan (1996), Margolis (1997) and Albanese (1999) were
funded by explicitly pro-gambling groups. As expected, they concluded that gambling had no impact
on crime. The Florida Department of Law Enforcement (1994) and Florida Sheriﬀs Association (1994),
which both opposed casinos, concluded that crime and drunk driving increased in Atlantic City and
Gulfport, MS, as a result of casinos.
The General Accounting Oﬃce (GAO) and NGISC concluded that deﬁnitive conclusions cannot
yet be made about the casino-crime link. According to the GAO (2000, p. 35), “In general, existing
data were not suﬃcient to quantify or deﬁne the relationship between gambling and crime... although
numerous studies have explored the relationship between gambling and crime, the reliability of many
of these studies is questionable.” This paper contributes to the literature on this important issue by
addressing each of the above limitations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the data we use. Section III analyzes the
theoretical links between casinos and crime, and Section IV outlines our estimation strategy. Section V
discusses our basic empirical results, and Section VI extends the results to border counties. Section VII
concludes. We ﬁnd that crime increases over time in casino counties, and that casinos do not just shift
crime from neighboring regions, but create crime. We estimate the crime-related social costs in casino
counties at approximately $75 dollars per adult per year.
II. Data
Our sample covers all 3,165 US counties from 1977-96. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)
Uniform Crime Report4 provided the number of arrests and oﬀenses for the 7 FBI Index I Oﬀenses:
aggravated assault, rape, robbery, murder, larceny, burglary, and auto theft.5 With the exception of
Alaska, the county jurisdictions remained unchanged over our sample period.
4U.S. Department of Justice, FBI, Uniform Crime Reports: County-level Detailed Arrest and Oﬀenses Data,
1977-1996,Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, FBI. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research (ICPSR, distributor).
5The deﬁnitions are listed in Crime in the United States: 1993 (U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau
of Investigation), Appendix H, 380-381.
2We used U.S. Census Bureau data for demographic control variables, including population density per
square mile, total county population, and population distributions by race, age and sex.6 The Regional
Economic Information System, of the Bureau of Commerce, provided data on income, unemployment,
income maintenance transfers, and retirement.7
The natural operating measure for casinos is gross revenue or proﬁts. Unfortunately, such panel data
do not exist—American Indian casinos are not required to report revenues. We therefore used the year
a county ﬁrst had an operating Class III8 gambling establishment, including riverboat casinos, American
Indian casinos, land-based casinos, and in the case of Florida and Georgia, “boats to nowhere”—cruises
that travel outside U.S. boundary waters so passengers can gamble. Not all forms of gambling qualify as
casinos. For example, Montana has hundreds of small gambling outlets that oﬀer keno or video poker,
many in gas stations along the highway. Also, California has many card houses, some of which were
illegal. These establishments are distinct from casinos in size and type of play.
To obtain casino opening dates we ﬁrst contacted state gaming authorities. In cases like Washington,
this was an expeditious way to ascertain the ﬁrst year a casino opened. However, even the central
gaming authorities and Indian aﬀairs committees often lacked information on Indian casinos. Therefore,
in most states we called each casino to obtain its opening date or ﬁrst date of Class III gambling if it
had previously operated other forms of gambling.9 We also used lists from the Casino City website,
6ICPSR (8384): “Intercensal Estimates of the Population of Counties by Age, Sex and Race (U.S.): 1970-80,”
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Winter 1985, ICPSR, Ann Arbor, MI 48106. “Intercensal
Estimates of the Population of Counties by Age, Sex and Race: 1970-1980 Tape Technical Documentation,” U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Current Pop. Reports, Series P-23, 103, “Methodology for Experimental Estimates of the
Population of Counties by Age and Sex: July 1, 1975.” U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population, 1980:
“County Population by Age, Sex, Race and Spanish Origin” (Preliminary OMB-Consistent Modiﬁed Race).
7Income maintenance includes Supplemental Security Insurance (SSI), Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), food stamps, and other income maintenance (which includes general assistance, emergency assistance,
refugee assistance, foster home care payments, earned income tax credits, and energy assistance). Unemployment
insurance beneﬁts include state unemployment insurance compensation, Unemployment Compensation for Federal
Civilian Employees (UCFE), Unemployment for Railroad Employees, and Unemployment for Veterans (UCX), and
other unemployment compensation (which consists of trade readjustment allowance payments, Redwood Park
beneﬁt payments, public service employment beneﬁt payments, and transitional beneﬁt payments). Retirement
payments included old age survivor and disability payments, railroad retirement and disability payments, federal
civilian employee retirement payments, military retirement payments, state and local government employee re-
tirement payments, federal and state workers’ compensation payments, and other forms of government disability
insurance and retirement pay.
8According to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988, Class I gambling consists of “social games solely
for prizes of minimal value.” Included in Class I gambling are traditional Indian games identiﬁed with tribal
ceremonies and celebrations. Class II gambling includes bingo and “games similar to bingo.” Class III gambling
includes “all forms of gaming that are not
Class I gaming or Class II gaming,” such as blackjack, slot machines, roulette, and other casino-style games.
9We distinguish operation date of Class III casinos from other dates such as the legislation date to authorize
3www.casinocity.com, which lists casinos in every state, and veriﬁed it against the annually-produced
Casinos: The International Casino Guide.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for casino and non-casino counties. Non-casino counties had
no casino in any year of the sample. Casino counties had a casino in operation during one or more years
of the period. Casino counties had higher population, land area, income, and crime rates.
Table 1: Demographic and Crime Data: Casino vs. Non-casino Counties.
Std. Sample Std. Sample
Variable Mean Dev. Size Mean Dev. Size
CASINO COUNTIES NON-CASINO COUNTIES
Population 145,330 288,149 3,533 73,209 252,381 59,053
Population Density (pop./sq. mile) 204 491 3,533 217 1,462 59,045
Area (square miles) 2,021 3.056 3,533 1,008 2,883 59,060
Per capita Personal Income $11,306 $2,689 3,533 $10,808 $2,618 59,040
Per capita Unemployment Ins. $78 $54 3,533 $65 $51 59,024
Per capita Retirement Comp. $10,771 $6,544 3,538 $9,831 $6,243 59,028
Aggravated Assault Rate 259 276 3,245 188 245 54,551
Rape Rate 29 28 3,182 20 32 53,882
Robbery Rate 82 136 3,254 44 143 54,623
Murder Rate 5.9 9.3 3,254 5.5 10.5 54,628
Larceny Rate 2,548 1,423 3,254 1,738 1,940 54,622
Burglary Rate 1,056 666 3,254 770 1,110 54,619
Auto Theft Rate 267 264 3,254 167 276 54,627
Notes: Crime rates are annual incidents per 100,000 population. Income is in 1982-84 dollars.
Between 1977 and 1996 the number of states with some form of casino gambling rose from one to
29. Counties with casinos grew from 14 (all in Nevada) to nearly 180. The Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act of 1988 increased the number of Indian casinos by mandating that states allow American Indian
gambling on trust lands if the state sanctioned the same gambling elsewhere. The semi-sovereign status
of Indian tribes and their management by the Federal Bureau of Indian Aﬀairs gave them greater leverage
with the states. By 1996, twenty-one states permitted casinos on Indian reservations.
casinos and the operation date of Class I or II establishments. Within a state, diﬀerent counties acquired casinos
at diﬀerent times. Also, bingo halls operated by American Indians converted to Class III gambling during our
sample. Nevada (1931) legalized commercial casino gambling prior to the start of our sample. Excluding Nevada
from our sample slightly increased the magnitude of the estimated casino-crime eﬀect. For example, when Nevada
was excluded from the Table 4 regressions 39 of the 42 post-opening coeﬃcient estimates became more positive
or less negative.
4Figure 1: Index Crime Rate and Number of Counties with Casinos: U.S. 1977-1998
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the number of counties with casinos (left scale) and the
crime rate (right scale). The crime rate ﬂuctuated between 1977 and 1990 when the number of casinos
was relatively constant. However, between 1990 and 1996 when the number of counties with casinos
increased rapidly, the crime rate dropped substantially. This contemporaneous casino growth and crime
reduction is important. Some have used these data to suggest that casinos reduced crime. For example,
Margolis (1997) stated, “Crime rates in Baton Rouge, LA have decreased every year since casino gaming
was introduced.” However, most regions experienced falling crime rates after 1991. Therefore, it is more
appropriate to compare the magnitude of the decreases between casino and non-casino counties. We
provide two comparisons of this type. Each suggests that crime rates in counties that opened casinos
during our sample increased relative to crime rates in non-casino counties.
The ﬁrst example, shown in Figure 2, contrasts the crime rate for casino and non-casino counties
between 1991-96. FBI Index I oﬀenses were summed by year for casino counties. Average crime rates for
1991-96 were calculated by dividing these totals by the populations of the counties in the corresponding
years. The series was then scaled to take the value 100 in the year 1991. The same procedure was
applied to non-casino counties.10 While crime dropped in both sets of counties, crime dropped 12.0
percentage points more in counties without casinos than in casino counties. The absolute reduction in
crime in non-casino counties (90.3 oﬀenses per 100,000) was about three times as large as the reduction
(30.6 oﬀenses per 100,000) in counties that opened a casino.
10Florida data are excluded from Fig. 2 because it changed its crime reporting from summary-based to incident-
based on Jan. 1, 1988 and switched back to summary-based in 1995. Crime data are missing in the transition
years. However, a Florida-only analysis is consistent with Figure 2. Between 1977-95 Florida counties that
opened casinos experienced greater growth than non-casino counties for murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny, and auto theft (19.9, 29.3, 27.3, 33.6, 7.7, 16.9, and 81 percentage points higher, respectively).
5Figure 2: Casino County vs. Non-casino County Crime Rates
The second example, shown in Figure 3, presents casino-county crime data centered on the year of
opening, where the average crime rate for the two years prior to casino opening and the year of opening
is set to 100. Crime rates were stable prior to opening, slightly lower in the year of casino introduction,
returned to approximately average levels for the next two or three years, and increased thereafter. By the
ﬁfth year after introduction, robbery, aggravated assaults, auto theft, burglary, larceny, rape, and murder
were 136, 91, 78, 50, 38, 21, and 12 percent higher, respectively. These eﬀects by year after introduction
suggest the need to estimate lead and lag structures to identify the relevant time dependencies.
Figure 3: Crime Before & After Casino Opening: Casino Counties Omitting Florida in 1988, 1996
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Previous studies focused on the empirical relationship between casinos and crime, but neglected theo-
retical explanations of how casinos aﬀect crime. We present two reasons why crime could decrease and
ﬁve reasons why crime could increase. We then discuss their diﬀerent impacts over time, an essential,
but previously ignored issue. These factors are not mutually exclusive, and our empirical results estimate
the net eﬀect of these factors.
A. Theoretical Connections between Casinos and Crime
Casinos might reduce crime directly by improving legal earning opportunities, or indirectly through
development eﬀects.
1. Wage Eﬀects: Grogger (1997) argued that increases in wages reduce crime, and Gould, Wein-
berg, and Mustard (2002) showed that increased employment and wages of low-skilled individuals reduce
crime. Therefore, if casinos provide greater labor market opportunities to low-skilled workers, they should
lower crime. Evans and Topoleski (2002) contend that when casinos are opened by American Indians,
the fraction of adults who are poor, who are more likely to commit crime, declines by 14 percent, and
that employment increases signiﬁcantly.
2. Development: Casinos may reduce crime indirectly through development eﬀects. In the Mid-
west, for example, legislation decriminalizing casino gambling cited economic development as its ratio-
nale. Decaying waterfronts and derelict sections of town that once harbored crime may be less amenable
to it when renovation occurs, streetlights appear, and resident presence increases. The streets near Las
Vegas casinos, even at night, are often cited as some of the safest.
Conversely, casinos may increase crime through direct and indirect channels.
1. Development: Casinos may raise crime by harming economic development, the opposite of the
indirect eﬀect discussed above. While some commend casinos for bringing growth, others criticize them
for draining the local economy, attracting unsavory clients, and for outcomes like prostitution and illegal
gambling-related activities.
2. Increased Payoﬀ to Crime: Casinos may increase crime by lowering the information costs
and increasing the potential beneﬁts of illegal activity. Travelers are often more vulnerable to crime
victimization, and because casinos attract gamblers and money, there is an increased payoﬀ to crime
from a higher concentration of cash and potential victims. A 1996 Kansas City case is illustrative: a
local restaurant owner was followed home, robbed, and murdered in his garage after winning $3,000 at
a casino (Reno, 1997). Similar stories exist in other locations with casinos.
3. Problem & Pathological Gambling: Crime may increase through problem and pathological
gamblers. Pathological gambling is a recognized impulse control disorder of the Diagnostic and Statis-
tical Manual (DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Association. Pathological gamblers (often referred
to as “addicted” or “compulsive” gamblers) are identiﬁed by repeatedly failing to resist the urge to
7gamble, relying on others to relieve the desperate ﬁnancial situations caused by gambling, committing
illegal acts to ﬁnance gambling, and losing control over their personal lives and employment. Problem
gamblers have similar problems, but to a lesser degree. Compared to those arrested for crime, problem
and pathological gamblers are more likely to be female, older, and have higher incomes.11
The geographical spread of casinos lowers the cost of buying the addictive good, which increases the
quantity consumed by problem gamblers, as evidenced by the rapid increase in Gamblers Anonymous
programs after casinos open. For example, the number of Wisconsin communities holding Gamblers
Anonymous meetings grew from 6 to 29 in the seven years after Indian tribes initiated agreements with
the state to open casinos in 1992. Eleven people who contacted the Wisconsin group in 1997 committed
suicide because of gambling. (Chicago Tribune, 8/2/99). The NGISC also reported a large increase in
Gamblers Anonymous from 650 chapters in 1990 to 1,328 in 1998, “a period of rapid legalized gambling
expansion”(NGISC, 1999b, pp. 4-17.)
Conversely, when gambling is restricted, the cost of consuming the addictive good increases. Begin-
ning July 1, 2000, South Carolina banned slot machines by court order. Six months later, the number
of Gamblers Anonymous groups had dropped from 32 to 11 and the attendance fell from a typical size
of about 40 to as few as one or two (Bridwell and Quinn, 2002, p. 718). During the same time, the
number of help-line calls in Horry County (Myrtle Beach) dropped from 200 per month to zero (Ibid.)
An often-cited Maryland study found that 62 percent of the Gamblers Anonymous group studied
committed illegal acts because of their gambling (Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene,
1990). 80 percent had committed civil oﬀenses and 23 percent were charged with criminal oﬀenses. A
similar survey of nearly 184 members of Gamblers Anonymous showed that 56 percent admitted stealing
to ﬁnance their gambling. The average stolen was $60,700 (median $500) for a total of $11.2 million
(Lesieur, 1998b).
4. Visitor Criminality: Crime may also rise because casinos attract visitors who are more prone to
commit and be victims of crime. Chesney-Lind and Lind (1986) suggested that one reason tourist areas
often have more crime is that tourists are crime targets. However, in the following section we show that
visitors to national parks do not increase crime. Therefore, if casino visitors induce crime, it is because
they are systematically diﬀerent from national park visitors or visitors to other attractions. The three
largest single tourist attractions in the United States in 1994 were the Mall of America (Bloomington,
MN), Disney World (Orlando, FL), and Branson, MO (country and western music) receiving 38, 34, and
5.6 million visitors, respectively. For comparison, Hawaii received approximately 6 million and Las Vegas
received 30.3 million visitors in 1994. Visitors per resident were 1,345 for Branson, 436 for Bloomington,
188 for Orlando, and 40 for Las Vegas. If visitors of any type are the predominant mechanism for crime,
Branson and Bloomington should be among the most crime-ridden places in North America. Even
adding visitors to residents in the denominator to calculate diluted crime rates, the crime rate per
11See NGISC 1999, Tables 4-2 and 4-5 and Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Issues 2002, Tables 4.7-4.10, 6.13,
6.16, 6.17.
8100,000 visitors-plus-residents was 187.3 for Las Vegas, 64 for Orlando, 16.4 for Branson, and 11.9 for
Bloomington. Bloomington received 7.7 million more visitors than Las Vegas, but had a diluted crime
rate less than 1
15th of Las Vegas’s. One indication of the diﬀerent clientele casinos attract is the large
increases in pawnshops that occur when casinos open. Other tourist areas do not experience similar
increases.
A few of the numerous press examples that explicitly link casino gambling to crime are as follows:
Authorities linked a woman arrested in Bradenton, FL to one of the largest and most
proﬁtable burglary rings in the country. Baton Rouge, La., police Detective Jonny Dunham
said that Barbara Dolinska and her cohorts like to gamble, and they committed many
crimes in areas that either had riverboat gambling operations or other kinds of gaming.
(Sarasota [Fla.] Herald-Tribune, 12/23/99)
A man arrested in the armed robbery of a (New Orleans) bar told deputies of his motive
for the hold up: he wanted to recover the several hundred dollars he lost playing the
lounge’s video poker machines. (Las Vegas Sun, 6/14/99)
Former San Jose police oﬃcer, Johnny Venzon Jr., was imprisoned for stealing from
people on his own beat while in uniform. Venzon, who blamed his actions on a gam-
bling addiction, often burglarized homes and then investigated the crimes. (San Francisco
Chronicle, 2/25/99)
Daniel Blank confessed to stealing over $100,000 and killing six Louisiana residents
from October 1996 to July 1997. Blank’s motivation for his brutality was to obtain cash
to support almost daily trips to video poker halls and casinos. Sometimes Blank headed
for casinos right after committing the crimes. ([New Orleans] Times-Picayune, 1/28/99)
5. Casino-inducedChanges in Population Composition: Gambling, along with gambling-related
industries such as hotels and restaurants, is one of the few growth sectors with a high demand for un-
skilled labor. An increase in demand for unskilled and lower-income employees may alter the composition
of the underlying labor force and residents toward those who are more apt to engage in criminal activity.
B. Eﬀects Across Types of Crime
Each crime mechanism need not have identical impacts across crimes. For example, improvements in
the legal sector reduce property crime more than violent crime (Gould, Weinberg, & Mustard, 2002).
Although murder has been tied to casino activities as described above, the statistical connection is harder
to detect because murder is rare in comparison to other crimes and because other causes predominate.
For this reason we expect casinos to contribute less to the overall explanation of murder rates.
Pathological gamblers generally commit crime to generate money either to deal with their debts or to
gamble. Peoria and Tazewell counties, surrounding one of Illinois’ oldest riverboats, have documented
9a signiﬁcant increase in casino-related embezzlement, theft, and burglary, much of it committed by
professionals like teachers and lawyers (Copley News Service, 6/28/99). Burglary, larceny and auto
theft, and the violent crime of robbery, have pecuniary payoﬀs. Casinos may aﬀect aggravated assault
because assault often occurs in the context of a crime with an economic payoﬀ. Because the FBI
classiﬁes each incident involving multiple oﬀenses under the most serious oﬀense, property crimes and
robberies that become assaults are categorized as assaults.
Identifying the link between casinos and rape is less obvious. Casinos may attract visitors more
likely to commit rape or to be its victims, and have an indirect eﬀect through the population compo-
sition eﬀect and social climate. Changed population might be related to casino-generated growth in
adult entertainment, escort services, and related industries, which show signiﬁcant increases measured
by advertising or the number of listings in the yellow pages. Many law enforcement oﬃcials have testi-
ﬁed that prostitution increased dramatically after casinos opened (FBI Conference on Casino Gaming,
1999). Pinnacle Entertainment was ﬁned $2.26 million by the Indiana Gaming Commission for supplying
prostitutes and gambling money to attendees at a golf outing sponsored by its Beltera Casino Resort
(Piskora, 2002).
C. Intertemporal Eﬀects on Crime
The theory importantly predicts that the eﬀects of casinos will vary over time. Reduction of crime
through improvements in labor market opportunities is observed prior to and shortly after the casino
opening as low-skilled people may be hired by the casino or casino-related industries. The economic
development theories (whether positive or negative) imply that a casino’s impact after opening will grow
until the casino market reaches equilibrium. Likewise, the visitor eﬀect and changing composition of the
population eﬀect appear with the casino’s opening and grow as people are attracted to the area.
Eﬀects operating through problem and pathological (P&P) gamblers will not be felt until a gambling
problem has developed. Breen and Zimmerman (2002) studied the time to pathology. “We found that
the men and women who ‘got hooked’ on video gambling became compulsive gamblers in about one
year. Those who got hooked on other kinds of gambling (such as horses, sports betting, blackjack, etc.)
became compulsive gamblers after about three and a half years” (RI Gambling Treatment Program,
2002). According to gambling treatment specialists, “Many addicted gamblers follow essentially the
same course... [t]hey enter a desperation stage, [the treatment specialist] said, and when they’ve used
up their own money and lines of credit they often turn to stealing,” (Schneider, 2003). In the same
article, police and prosecutors “told the newspaper that in recent years, with the arrival of casino
gambling in the area, they have seen an increase in exactly the kinds of crimes [the convicted subject of
the story] has acknowledged committing” (Ibid). Successful Evansville attorney Allan Lossemore’s case
(Rohrig, 2002) is symptomatic of the role of time lags. He began going to the Casino Aztar in July
1997 and for the ﬁrst three or four months won enough money to subsidize his ﬂedgling law practice.
10But by early 1998 he began to lose. “I started to draw from charge cards and from a line of credit in
an attempt to get even,” he reported. He tried to get back on track by barring himself from the casino
and staying away from gambling, but late in 1999 he gambled again and lost. After a series of personal
and professional ﬁnancial circumstances, in mid-2000 he misappropriated client’s funds. “From there, I
was just robbing Peter to pay Paul. I was gambling at that point pretty heavily—I was really trying to
make up the diﬀerence.” He was arrested in November 2000 and later jailed.
Research conducted for the NGISC reported that the population percentage of problem gamblers
rose from .3 percent to 1.1 percent when the distance to the nearest casino fell from more than 250
miles to less than 50 miles, and rose from .4 percent to 1.3 percent for pathological gamblers (NGISC,
1999a, p. 28). Distances less than 50 miles were not studied, thus a diﬀerence of 1.7% in P&P
gambling probably understates. Research on the degree of P&P gambling in Las Vegas found the rate
was 6.6% (Strow, 1999), suggesting that a diﬀerence of 5.9% is closer to an upper bound. If problem
and pathological gamblers are an important explanation of crime, we expect to observe crime increase
over time as more people start to gamble, develop gambling problems, and eventually commit crime to
fund their losses. Because diﬀerent causes are at work, and may operate diﬀerently for diﬀerent crimes,
there is no presumption that intertemporal eﬀects must be identical.
IV. Estimation Strategy
Our empirical strategy addresses many limitations of the current research. First, by conducting the
most exhaustive investigation and utilizing a comprehensive county-level data set that includes every
U.S. county we eliminate sample selection concerns. Second, by analyzing crime eﬀects over time we
exploit the time series nature of our data. Third, we are the ﬁrst to articulate a comprehensive theory
about how casinos could increase or decrease crime. Last, we use the most exhaustive set of control
variables, most of which are commonly excluded from other studies.
A. Direct and Indirect Eﬀects
As noted, casinos may aﬀect crime rates directly through their eﬀects on the resident local population
and indirectly by increasing the number of casino visitors. The total impact includes both direct and
indirect eﬀects, explained in equations (1) and (2), where crime (Cit) in county i in year t is a function
of the presence of a casino, the number of casino visitors (Vit) to the county, and other variables that
aﬀect crime (summarized in the term Other) where a,b,c, and d are unknown coeﬃcients.
Cit = aCasinoit + bVit + Otherit (1)
Vit = cAttractionsi + dCasinoit (2)
11Casino visitors in (2) depend on both the visitor attractiveness of the county (Attractionsi) and the
presence of the casino. Coeﬃcient a measures the direct eﬀect of the casino on crime. Coeﬃcients b
and d measure the indirect eﬀect via casino visitors. Substituting from (2) into (1) gives
Cit = βi + δCasinoit + Otherit (3)
where δ = a+bd, and βi = bcAttractionsi. The total eﬀect of the casino on crime, δ, in (3), includes
the eﬀects on both the local population and casino visitors. Estimating a in (1) would give only a partial
eﬀect because it would not take into account the visitor eﬀect.12 The key to our being able to estimate
the full eﬀect is having time series data. Because many studies of the casino-crime relationship used
cross-sectional data, they were limited to estimating only a partial eﬀect.
B. Visitors
Although distinguishing direct and indirect eﬀects is important, it is also important to avoid the as-
sumption that anything that attracts the same number of visitors will have the same crime eﬀects.
Diﬀerent types of visitors may have systematically diﬀerent eﬀects on crime even if the impact for all
types of visitors is positive. The presence of a casino in (3) proxies for direct eﬀects on crime and for
an increased number of casino visitors. It does not necessarily follow that the same number of visitors
for another purpose would generate the same crime outcomes. Visitors for other purposes appear in the
variable Otherit, which we now address.
Time series visitor data do not exist at the county level and certainly do not distinguish visitors for
diﬀerent purposes. Running regression (3) without such information, therefore, risks potential omitted
variable bias. In partial defense, no other crime studies have been run with these data either. However,
more importantly, in the case of casinos the omitted variables are likely uncorrelated with a new casino.
Fortunately, for at least one type of tourist data are available that we can use to test the hypotheses
of being uncorrelated with openings and having an eﬀect on crime diﬀerent from the eﬀect of casinos.
We obtained National Park Service time series data from 1978 to 1998 on all visitors to national parks,
monuments, historic sites, recreation areas and so on. These parks and attractions, scattered across the
country, receive millions of visitors annually—some as many as 14 million. Some, such as Yellowstone
National Park, are in counties with sparse population, while others are in highly populated areas. In most
cases the correlation between park visitors and the casino variables used in the study was well below 1
percent, and in no case was a correlation above 1.7 percent. This is consistent with the view that this
type of omitted variable bias is likely to be small or zero. Although it is always preferable to include
such variables when possible, we are conﬁdent that in the case of casinos the procedure employed by
12Ideally we would like to know both a and b. Because of data constraints, we must estimate only the total
eﬀect δ. Casino visitor data do not exist at the county level. Both a and b might be estimated using other
variables to proxy for the number of casino visitors, but there are no annual time-series data at the county level.
12(3) of treating data on other visitors as part of the constant term and the error term is not a problem
for the coeﬃcients of interest.13
A second analytical issue is whether to use “diluted” or “undiluted” crime rates. Should the number
of crimes be divided by population—the conventional way to generate the crime rate (undiluted)—or by
population plus visitors (diluted)? There are four possibilities depending on whether one considers total
or partial eﬀects, and studies diluted or undiluted crime rates. Some have argued for one combination
or another without realizing that the choice is not methodological, but depends on what questions the
researcher wants to answer. A common but invalid claim is that the diluted crime rate should be used to
determine the change in probability that a resident would be the victim of a crime. However, knowing
what happens to the diluted crime rate does not give the needed information and could even move in the
wrong direction. To illustrate, let s1 be the share of the resident population P victimized by residents,
and let s2 be the share of the resident population victimized by visitors V . Similarly, let σ1 be the share
of visitors victimized by residents, and σ2 the share of visitors victimized by visitors. Then the crime
rate is s1+s2+(σ1+σ2)V
P ; the diluted crime rate is (s1+s2)wP +(σ1+σ2)wV where wP and wV are
the share of visitors plus residents made up by residents and visitors, respectively; and the probability
of a resident’s being a crime victim is s1 + s2. If residents do not victimize visitors (σ1 =0 ), then
P = V and (s2 + σ2) is smaller than s1. The probability of a resident being victimized is s1 without
visitors, and it rises to s1 + s2 with visitors. The diluted crime rate is s1 without visitors and falls to
(s1 + s2 + σ2)/2 with visitors. Thus in this case the diluted crime rate falls while the probability of a
resident being victimized rises.
In this study we are interested in the costs to the host county associated with a change in crime
from whatever source. We are therefore interested in the total eﬀect of casinos on crime, and thus use
the undiluted crime rate based on equation (3).
C. Timing: Separating Casino Eﬀects from Other Eﬀects
The version of equation (3) that we estimated is
Cit = α + βiXi + γtTt + δLit + θAit + εit (4)
13When visitors to National Park Service sites were included, the regressions (3) showed that an additional one
million park visitors annually were associated with statistically signiﬁcantly fewer crime incidents for rape, murder,
robbery, and burglary, and had a statistically insigniﬁcant eﬀect on auto thefts. The eﬀect of park visitors on
larceny and assaults were statistically signiﬁcant but socially insigniﬁcant compared to the crime eﬀects found for
casinos (coeﬃcient δ) and reported in section V. For example, we estimated the long-run eﬀect of a casino on
larcenies to be 615, which was roughly 60 times larger than the eﬀect of one million national park visitors. This
means that if the crime consequences of casino visitors and national park visitors were identical, a casino would
have to attract over 59 million visitors annually to account for 615 additional larcenies. Las Vegas, the single
largest casino gambling destination in the United States, attracted 30.3 million visitors in 1994.
13where Cit is the crime rate (oﬀenses per 100,000 people) of county i in year t, α is a constant, and
βi is the vector of estimated coeﬃcients on the county-level ﬁxed eﬀects that control for unobserved
characteristics across counties. The time ﬁxed eﬀect, Tt, controls for national crime rate trends. Our
base speciﬁcation of Lit is a vector of the casino opening dummy variables that includes 2 leads and
5 lags of the opening variable and captures the important intertemporal eﬀects outlined earlier. The
opening dummy variable takes the value of one in the year the casino began operation and zero in other
years. In the reported regressions we used two years of leads because it is unlikely that a casino would
aﬀect the crime rate more than two years prior to its opening. We stopped at ﬁve years of lags because
the number of counties with casinos open three to ﬁve years, not counting Nevada counties, was 91,
59, and 35, respectively. 12 counties (26 including Nevada counties) had casinos open for 6 or more
years, and 7 (21 including Nevada counties) had casinos open 7 or more years. For each group, however,
observations are scattered widely across the decades and geography of our sample.
Ait is a vector of 22 control variables. It includes population density, the percent of the population
that was male, percent that was black, percent that was white, and the percent between the ages of
10-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64, and over 65.14 Economic variables in Ait are real per capita personal
income, real per capita unemployment insurance payments, real per capita retirement compensation
per old person, and real per capita income maintenance payments. All income ﬁgures were adjusted
to 1982-84 $ base. Ait also includes a dummy variable indicating whether the county honored a “shall
issue” right allowing citizens to carry a concealed ﬁrearm upon request, and two years of leads and ﬁve
years of lags on the shall issue dummy. εit is the regression error. Including leads and lags, the regression
had 50 explanatory variables plus one constant for each county (3,165) for a total of 3,215 explanatory
variables. This set was expanded to 58 variables plus county constants when we analyzed the eﬀects
of casinos on adjacent counties. Excluding observations with missing data reduced the sample size in
most regressions to about 58,000, leaving more than adequate degrees of freedom for estimation.
We independently estimated each lead and lag of the casino opening year (describing the timing of
crime eﬀects) without cross restrictions. We weighted regression observations by county population.
V. Results
Before reporting the more sophisticated lag structure discussed above, we begin with a simple dummy
variable for whether a county has a casino. Table 2 reports two such regressions for each crime. The
left column for each crime reports the estimated coeﬃcient for the casino dummy variable. The variable
“Casino” takes the value of 1 if a casino is operating in the county for the year in question and zero
otherwise. No other explanatory variables are present in the leftmost regression. The regressions all show
a large statistically signiﬁcant elevated crime rates for counties with operating casinos. For example,
14The remaining groups were Hispanics and those between 0 and 9 years.
14Table 2: Casino Crime Rate Regressions Employing Casino Dummy Variable Only.
Violent Crime
Aggravated Assault Rape Robbery Murder
Casino 157.254 17.825 11.521 0.973 86.905 34.175 1.522 0.117
(23.04) (4.29) (17.91) (2.04) (12.09) (10.07) (6.88) (0.75)
Year Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
County Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 57796 57796 57064 57064 57877 57877 57882 57882
F 530.68 754.52 320.88 126.60 146.06 212.39 47.30 81.94
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0091 0.8147 0.0056 0.7234 0.0025 0.8861 0.0008 0.7506
Property Crime
Larceny Burglary Auto Theft
Casino 1128.547 218.850 144.373 -23.927 266.582 217.416
(31.88) (9.44) (7.58) (-1.58) (21.72) (30.87)
Constant Yes No Yes No Yes No
Year Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
County Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 57876 57876 57873 57873 57881 57881
F 1016.63 138.15 57.45 635.32 471.71 472.89
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.0173 0.7839 0.0010 0.6699 0.0081 0.8328
Notes: Coeﬃcients are additional annual crime incidents per 100,000 population. t-statistics are in parentheses.
according to Table 2 such counties experience 157 more aggravated assaults annually per 100,000
population. This compares to average aggravated assault crime rates of 188 per 100,000 population
for counties without casinos in any year of the sample reported in Table 1. The right column for each
crime reports the estimate of the casino dummy when year and county ﬁxed eﬀects are the only other
explanatory variables included in the regression. In each case the impact attributed to an operating
casino declines. Aggravated assault, for example, falls from 157 to under 18. The coeﬃcient estimates
are positive and statistically signiﬁcant for ﬁve crimes. The estimated eﬀect is positive for
murder and negative for burglary; neither of which are statistically signiﬁcant. To summarize the
two regressions, when a simple dummy variable speciﬁcation is used for a casino being open, the
estimated casino eﬀect is positive and statistically signiﬁcant in twelve of the fourteen regressions.
The other two results are not statistically diﬀerent from zero. These before-after results obscure
the intertemporal eﬀects, so we now turn our attention to the model that includes leads and lags.
Tables 3 and 4 report coeﬃcients and t-statistics for speciﬁcations of (4) that allow for the
timing of the eﬀects of casino opening. Table 3 results include year ﬁxed eﬀects and county ﬁxed
15eﬀects but exclude the Ait control variables while the Table 4 includes these regressors.15 For
example, the coeﬃcient of Lag 4 in the Table 3 column labeled “Aggravated Assault” indicates
that the aggravated assault rate was higher by 62.153 oﬀenses per 100,000 population four years
after a casino opened in the county. The number of observations for each regression varied from
57,023 to 57,841. The R2 was between .67 and .89.
The patterns in both tables show that casino eﬀects tend to increase over time after a lag of
2-3 years. In Table 3, which does not include control variables, the estimates on the casino leads
Table 3: Casino Crime Rate Regressions Excluding Control Variables.
Aggravated
Assault Rape Robbery Murder Larceny Burglary Auto Theft
Lead 2 4.325 1.189 13.178 .725 113.498 33.865 114.440
(0.61) (1.42) (2.26) (2.73) (1.64) (0.79) (9.46)
Lead 1 4.455 0.708 19.067 1.270 160.828 28.071 142.864
(0.64) (0.86) (3.32) (4.85) (1.82) (0.57) (11.98)
Open 8.799 .250 19.142 1.251 229.687 −19.609 182.095
(1.19) (0.29) (3.15) (4.53) (2.61) (−0.55) (14.47)
Lag 1 16.656 1.765 47.031 1.360 315.990 54.171 236.103
(2.24) (2.06) (7.72) (4.91) (2.99) (0.76) (18.69)
Lag 2 3.647 0.684 56.089 1.305 193.729 3.025 225.876
(0.46) (0.76) (8.63) (4.41) (0.89) (0.03) (16.75)
Lag 3 29.953 3.436 81.467 0.801 201.816 13.797 253.046
(3.22) (3.23) (10.67) (2.30) (1.51) (0.25) (15.98)
Lag 4 62.153 7.021 75.755 0.429 460.681 153.209 246.417
(4.76) (4.72) (7.08) (0.88) (2.74) (2.74) (11.11)
Lag 5 124.683 7.076 76.725 −1.496 715.031 236.992 376.278
(7.80) (3.87) (5.84) (−2.50) (2.65) (2.97) (13.80)
Ai Control Variables No No No No No No No
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 57755 57023 57836 57841 57835 57832 57840
F 562.01 95.50 163.79 63.83 19.25 79.81 358.19
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
R-squared 0.8149 0.7236 0.8865 0.7511 0.7843 0.6730 0.8334
Notes: Coeﬃcients are additional annual crime incidents per 100,000 population. t-statistics are in parentheses.
We used robust standard errors for larceny and burglary, which Breush-Pagan test indicated had heteroscedasticity.
15We report casino variables. Results for the 588 other coeﬃcients for the seven crime regressions are omitted
for space, because they are used as controls, and because we are primarily interested in the casino variables.
16are often positive and statistically signiﬁcant, consistent with the common belief that casinos are
more likely to be placed in high-crime areas. However, when control variables are included, all of
the leads are zero except for those on auto theft.
Another key diﬀerence is that Table 3 shows much larger increases in crime in the lagged years.
When the control variables are included in Table 4, these larger positive estimates are reduced.
Because the Table 4 estimates have better ﬁt in the lead variables and the added control variables
reduce omitted variable bias, we emphasize these results that show smaller casino eﬀects on crime.
Table 4: Casino Crime Rate Regressions Including Control Variables
Aggravated
Assault Rape Robbery Murder Larceny Burglary Auto Theft
Lead 2 −3.843 0.157 6.924 0.438 37.710 16.481 97.006
(−0.55) (0.19) (1.21) (1.00) (0.63) (0.43) (8.43)
Lead 1 −8.498 −0.815 8.164 0.969 47.645 −6.164 113.656
(−1.24) (−1.01) (1.44) (1.34) (0.61) (−0.14) (10.00)
Open 0.376 −0.644 11.218 1.103 148.279 −23.625 152.659
(0.05) (−0.77) (1.88) (1.37) (1.74) (−0.72) (12.72)
Lag 1 2.613 0.955 32.588 1.188 173.836 30.661 183.735
(0.36) (1.14) (5.43) (1.68) (1.83) (0.55) (15.24)
Lag 2 −9.739 −0.267 39.137 1.181 −0.447 −51.987 161.791
(−1.25) (−0.30) (6.08) (1.46) (−0.00) (−0.68) (12.53)
Lag 3 20.306 3.339 70.427 1.099 4.132 −48.495 206.769
(2.22) (3.20) (9.30) (1.32) (0.03) (−0.89) (13.60)
Lag 4 42.844 6.503 52.188 0.572 184.855 64.367 161.641
(3.34) (4.47) (4.93) (0.54) (1.41) (0.92) (7.60)
Lag 5 99.982 9.979 65.240 −0.458 614.695 325.147 271.848
(6.38) (5.59) (5.02) (−0.55) (1.98) (2.30) (10.43)
Ai Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Fixed Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 57724 56992 57805 57810 57804 57801 57809
F 393.15 129.78 143.37 13.34 42.97 121.18 346.19
Prob > F 0.0000 0.00000 0.0000 0.0000 0.00000 0.00000 0.0000
R-squared 0.8252 0.7410 0.8913 0.7623 0.7992 0.6997 0.8504
Notes: Coeﬃcients are additional annual crime incidents per 100,000 population. t-statistics are in parentheses.
We used robust standard errors for larceny and burglary, which Breush-Pagan test indicated had heteroscedasticity.
17A. Violent Crime
Figure 4 displays the information for violent crime from Table 4. The horizontal axis plots the
casino opening leads and lags, and the vertical axis plots the coeﬃcient estimates. The vertical
lines show the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals, the range within which the regression indicates
the true coeﬃcient should lie with 95 percent probability.
For aggravated assault, only estimates for the third and subsequent year after opening are
signiﬁcantly above zero, and the trend rises. The estimated high occurs in the ﬁfth year after
opening, when the aggravated assault rate is 100 assaults higher per year. This pattern of crime
increase is unlike the typical pattern of visitor increases after casino opening. Grinols and Omorov
(1996) showed the number of visitors to Illinois casinos typically rose immediately after opening
and reached equilibrium levels after six months or fewer.16
Figure 4.2 for rape shows coeﬃcient estimates that are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 prior
to the opening. However, they are positive and signiﬁcant in the third and subsequent years
after the casino opened, rising from the third year on. A county that introduces a casino might
expect a negligible impact in the ﬁrst two years after opening, but a higher rape rate by 6.5 to
10 incidents per 100,000 population in the fourth and ﬁfth years after opening.
The pattern for robbery (Figure 4.3) is similar to the patterns for aggravated assault and rape
with one important exception—the increase in robbery begins immediately. In the ﬁrst year there
were about 35 more robberies per 100,000 people, which increases to over 60 three years after
opening.
As expected, the impact of casinos on murder is the smallest of all oﬀenses. Figure 4.4 shows
that casino counties have slightly higher murder rates than non-casino counties both before and
after opening. However, murder shows no statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates for any
of the casino leads or lags, and the change from before to after is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Gambling-related murders include incidents such as the disgruntled gambler who killed a casino
teller when he tried to retrieve his gambling losses, a spouse who fought over the other’s gambling
losses and was murdered, a parent’s gambling leading to the death of her child, murder for
insurance, and similar tales.17 However, because murder is the least frequently committed crime
16In addition to the regressions reported, we ran regressions that included as many as 4 leads and 7 years
of lags of the casino opening variable. With few exceptions, leads continued the pattern of being statistically
indistinguishable from zero and later lags showed comparable or greater estimated eﬀects to the 5th year lag. In
the case of murder, the 6th and 7th lags continued the pattern of being statistically indistinguishable from zero.
17See Jeﬀry Bloomberg, Prepared Statement, Hearing Before the Committee on Small Business, House of
Representatives, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 21 September 1994, Serial No. 103-104, Washington, D.C.:
USGPO, p. 47. Accounts of the more spectacular gambling-related murders and deaths (most often suicides)
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and most counties have zero murders, murder rates typically have high variance, which makes it
diﬃcult to identify eﬀects.
B. Property Crime
Figure 5 displays the Table 4 coeﬃcient estimates for property crimes. The larceny estimates
increase from 0 in the second year after opening, to 4.1 in the third, 185 in the fourth, and over
615 in the ﬁfth year after opening. Burglary increases from negative estimates in the second and
third years after opening, to 64 in the fourth, to 325 in the ﬁfth. Only the ﬁfth year estimates
are individually statistically signiﬁcant so we investigated further the signiﬁcance of the rising
frequently appear in the press. USA Weekend, February 10-12, 1995, p. 20, for example, describes a man killing
his wife and beating up his daughter in a ﬁght over his gambling away thousands of dollars. The Associated Press,
September 3, 1997, reported on the 10-day-old infant who died of dehydration after being left in a warm car for
about seven hours while her mother played video poker in South Carolina. A mother in Illinois was convicted of
killing her infant children for insurance money because of her gambling.
193rd, 4th, and 5th year coeﬃcients. We checked whether the rising patterns of coeﬃcients in the
last three years with the lag 5 coeﬃcients positive and signiﬁcant persisted or disappered after
the ﬁfth year. Estimates of the sixth and seventh year lags were 745 and 1069 for larceny and
201 and 229 for burglary, respectively. Moreover, lags 5 through 7 pass a 5 percent F-test for
signiﬁcance for both oﬀenses.
Figure 5: Casino Eﬀects—Property Crime
Figure 5.3 for auto theft presents a diﬀerent picture. It is the only crime that showed statisti-
cally signiﬁcant leads, which were positive. After opening, crime rates increase slightly for a few
years and increase substantially after ﬁve years. The data indicate that casino counties did not
experience the same decreases in autho thefts that non-casino counties did after 1991, when the
number of casinos increased rapidly.18
18A similar divergence in Florida started in 1984 and grew after that, consistent with Florida casino openings.
The ﬁrst Florida casinos opened in two counties in 1982, two more opened in 1988, and the rest opened between
1990 and 1995.
20A second factor may be that we were unable to control for Lojack, an electronic tracking
system that allows police to quickly locate and recover stolen autos. Ayres and Levitt (1998)
found that Lojack accounted for a signiﬁcant reduction in auto thefts in the 1990s. Because cities
that implemented Lojack generally do not have casinos, we may overstate the eﬀect of casinos
on auto theft.19 It is also possible that Lojack’s use is not yet suﬃciently widespread to greatly
aﬀect our estimates.
C. Additional Robustness Checks
The precisely correct model of crime is not known. Thus, in addition to the comparison of Tables
3 and 4 we considered several additional formulations to test the robustness of the results.
1. Law Enforcement Variables: All the regressions reported to this point omit law en-
forcement variables. Although including them reduces omitted variable bias, it also introduces
sample bias by signiﬁcantly limiting the number of counties with available data.20 To examine
this tradeoﬀ we included two additional sets of law enforcement control variables. When we
included the arrest rate as an explanatory variable, the estimated casino eﬀects for almost every
year after opening and for almost all crimes were higher than those reported in Table 4. There-
fore, the Table 4 results that we emphasize are biased biased against the ﬁnding that casinos
increase crime. Although arrest rates are often undeﬁned, the problem is even bigger for other
law enforcement variables.
County-level conviction rates and sentence lengths are available for only four states (Mustard
2003), and annual police employment is unavailable at the county level.
We also included explanatory variables that estimated the probability of capital punishment,
which we estimated in four diﬀerent ways.21 When these variables are included, the results are
19Ayres and Levitt (1998) showed that Lojack had little eﬀect on other oﬀenses, so our results for the other
crimes will not be aﬀected.
20For example, the arrest rate is undeﬁned when there are 0 oﬀenses for a given crime type. Many small counties
record no oﬀenses even for property crimes for a given year, and large counties frequently have no oﬀenses for
murder and rape, which consequently produce a large number of missing observations for the arrest rate. For
some oﬀenses including the arrest rate eliminated over 30,000 observations. See Lott and Mustard (1997) and
Levitt (1998) for more detailed discussions.
21The ﬁrst was a prorated number of executions in the previous and current year divided by the number of
people sentenced to death six years ago. The second was the number of executions in the ﬁrst three quarters
of the current year and last quarter of the previous year divided by the number of people sentenced to death six
years ago. The third is a prorated count of executions in the previous and current year divided by the number
of persons on death row at that time. The last was the number of executions in the ﬁrst three quarters of the
current year and the last quarter of the previous year, divided by the number of persons on death row at that time.
21qualitatively the same as the base regression. There are slight diﬀerences of the estimated eﬀects
for diﬀerent crimes in diﬀerent post-opening years, but the general qualitative trends are similar.
That the inlcusion of law enforcementvariables generally increases the estimated casino eﬀects
is consistent with reports from law enforcement oﬃcials that enforcement expenditures increased
substantially when casinos opened. Stephen Silvern (FBI in Atlantic City) documented that
expenditures for the Atlantic City Police Department and Prosecutor’s Oﬃce grew much more
rapidly in the late 1970s and early 80s than similar expenditures in the rest of the state and nation
(Federal Bureau of Investigation Conference on Casino Gaming, 1999). The Director of the
Indiana Gambling Commission reported that Indiana hired an additional 120 state troopers when
the casinos opened in 1995.22 Allocations for police services also rose substantially in New Orleans
upon introduction of casinos.23 Law enforcementoﬃcials emphasize that to maintain public safety
spending on enforcementresources must increase when casinos open. Because we cannot measure
all these additional resources that reduce crime, our estimates without enforcement variables tend
to understate the eﬀect of casinos on crime.
2. Casino-Population Density Interactions: A natural question is whether the impact
of casinos on crime varies with the type of county, such as a rural-urban diﬀerence related
to population density. To test for a population density interaction, we multiplied each of the
eight casino opening lead and lag variables by the county population density and re-ran the
original regressions including these eight new variables. The density interaction coeﬃcients were
statistically signiﬁcant as a group at the 1 percent or better level for all regressions except
aggravated assault and larceny, which were signiﬁcant at the 11 percent and 46 percent levels,
respectively. With the exception of murder and auto theft, the same rising pattern of crime after
casino introduction was observed as found in the original regressions. Crime is not statistically
diﬀerent from zero in the years before casino introduction and immediately thereafter, but begins
to rise three or four years after introduction. By the ﬁfth year after casino introduction, a
statistically signiﬁcantly elevated crime rate for both low- and high-density counties appears.
Introducing a density eﬀect does not change the prediction of the model. These results give us
conﬁdence that the eﬀect of casinos on crime is similar in large and small counties. For auto
theft the casino eﬀect is largest for less densely populated counties.
Gittings and Mocan (2003) provided the ﬁrst two variables and explain the last two measures in more detail.
22John Thar, Director of the Indiana Gambling Commission, report at Federal Bureau of Investigation Confer-
ence on Casino Gaming, 1999, Louisville, Kentucky.
23Lt. Joseph P. Lopinto, Jr., Commander of the Gambling Section of the New Orleans Police Department,
reported that his department has been signiﬁcantly resource-constrained since the opening of New Orleans’ casinos
and the resulting increase in demand for police services. Federal Bureau of Investigation Conference on Casino
Gaming, 1999, Louisville, Kentucky.
22D. Summary
We summarize the results in Table 4 and Figures 4 and 5. First, the casino opening lead variables
suggest that after controlling for other variables casinos were not more likely to be placed in areas
that had systematically diﬀerent crime environments than other regions.
Second, after casinos opened casino-county crime rates increased relative to the non-casino-
county rates. Thirty four of the 42 estimated casino eﬀects (one opening and six lags for each
of seven oﬀenses) are positive, nineteen of which are statistically signiﬁcant at the .05 level, and
others are signiﬁcant at the .10 level. In contrast, none of the 8 negative estimates are statistically
signiﬁcant. As expected, murder exhibits no relationship to casino gambling.
Third, the time pattern of estimated coeﬃcients implies that the casino eﬀects may change
over time. With the exception of murder, all crimes show higher estimates for the last coeﬃcients
(lags 4 and 5) than for the ﬁrst two (leads 2 and 1). For most oﬀenses, the statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences tend to appear two or three years after casino opening. Only one coeﬃcient for year of
opening is statistically signiﬁcant. Estimates of the sixth and seventh lags (run but not reported)
are typically positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Fourth, the increase over time in casino impact is consistent with the eﬀects outlined in the
theory. For example, the crime mitigating inﬂuences through increased wages and employment
should occur before and shortly after opening. In contrast, the crime increasing factors are more
long term. Casino-induced changes in population and the eﬀects of negative development grow
over time. Also, clinical research shows that problem and pathological gamblers typically take
about two to four years to start gambling, become addicted, exhaust alternative resources, and
eventually commit crime. Studies that did not have large data sets or a suﬃcient number of
years of observations after casino opening, and that did not allow for the impact of casinos to
change over time, missed these eﬀects. An additional potential explanation of the time pattern
is that casinos have an immediate impact on crime, but that impact is ameliorated by a large
increase in police resources, which are typically signiﬁcantly increased when casinos open, but
do not maintain the same rate of growth over time. The slightly more immediate impact of
casinos on violent crime may be explained in terms of imported criminals. It may take less time
to habituate to a new casino’s location than for people to exhaust their resources.
E. Evaluation
The regressions in Table 4, of course, cannot decompose the net number of oﬀenses to assign
to each alternative explanation. Nevertheless, it is instructive to ask how many crimes Table 4
would imply per additional P&P gambler if all estimated additional crime incidents were arbitrar-
23ily assigned to this one source. The coeﬃcients report additional crime incidents per 100,000



















The total number of crime incidents estimated in Table 4 in the ﬁfth year after casino opening
is x =1 ,386.4.I f y = .059, as in the numbers reported for Las Vegas for example, then the
average additional problem and pathological gambler would have to commit .23 crime incidents
per year to account for all additional crime, or roughly one in four P&P gamblers would have to
commit a crime annually. This ﬁgure rises to .82 if y = .017 at the other extreme. 20-80% are
reasonable proportions relative to the information reported above that 80% of problem gamblers
studied committed civil oﬀenses, 56% had stolen, and 23% were charged with criminal oﬀenses.
In contrast, if the calculation suggested that each P&P would be required to commmit one dozen
crime incidents per year the numbers would be of a diﬀerent magnitude.
The Table 4 coeﬃcients also allow us to gauge the fraction of observed crime due to casinos.
Summing the estimated number of crimes attributable to casinos for each county, taking into
account how many years the casino was in operation, and dividing by the casino counties’ total
population measures the contribution of casinos to observed crime. Estimates of the share of
crime attributable to casinos in 1996 for individual crimes ranged between 5.5 and 30 percent.
Auto theft was the highest, followed by robbery at 23 percent. The values for the rest of the
oﬀenses were between 5.5 and 10 percent.
We provide three estimates of the implied cost of additional crime. First, we use the cost per
victimization ﬁgures adjusted to 2003 dollars using the CPI-U to calculate the total social cost
of crimes committed in casino counties that are attributable to the casino presence according to
the coeﬃcients in Table 4 (Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema (1996), column 4 of Table 9, p. 24).
We also report the total social cost for casino counties on a per adult basis. Finally, although
the social cost of property crime is not synonymous with the value of the lost property, the latter
is nevertheless useful in describing the eﬀect of casinos. The Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics Table 3.112, p. 298 contains data about the average property loss for four of the
oﬀenses in this paper—robbery, larceny, burglary, and auto theft. For those oﬀenses we took
the 5th year lag coeﬃcient estimates for each crime and multiplied them by the average loss per
crime adjusted to 2003 dollars using the CPI-U. This produced property loss numbers per 100,000
population which can be aggregated to the entire adult population.
In 1996 the total costs for the 178 casino counties exceeded $1.24 billion per year. If the
estimated coeﬃcients from Table 4 are applied to a representative county of 100,000 population,
2471.3 percent of which are adults as is representative of the United States as a whole, then the
social costs per adult are $75 in 2003 dollars. These costs reﬂect the proﬁle of lagged eﬀect
on crimes experienced by the particular sample of casino counties making up our data set. The
value of lost property from the four property crimes is $2.905 million for a population of 100,000,
($29.05 per adult), which becomes $5.91 billion when aggregated to the national level for 2003.
We can compare these costs to other estimates that relied on a diﬀerent methodology. Social
costs of casinos have commonly been estimated in terms of the average cost imposed on society
by a P&P gambler24 multiplied by their number. In the most recent comprehensive study of this
type of which we are aware, Thompson, Gazel, and Rickman (1996b) found that total social
costs were $135 per adult in 1996 dollars, of which $57 (40%) were due to police and judicial-
related costs and thefts.25 Thompson, et al. reported that they intentionally “projected numbers
believed to be very conservative,” and that the crime costs in their sample (Wisconsin) were
probably lower than similar costs in other locations. Adjusting crime costs to 2003 dollars, their
estimate is $67. Taking into account the diﬀerent samples and methodologies, their estimate is
remarkably close to the direct costs estimated here for 1996 of $75.
Corrective taxes reﬂect the costs that an industry imposes on society. Assuming crime costs
no lower than $75 (there are crimes other than FBI Index I such as embezzlement not considered
here), crime costs equal to 40% of total social costs, and revenues for a representative casino of
$400 per adult26 each year, implies tax rates above 47% of revenues. In a few cases tax schedules
for high-end casinos include portions where average tax rates reach these levels.27 Having applied
proper taxes, continued operation would be eﬃcient in a Kaldor-Hickes sense.28 If it is feasible
to oﬀer gambling in an altered manner that causes fewer P&P gamblers and less crime, then this
may be better for society than a response based on taxes.
24Some studies group problem gamblers with pathological gamblers, some treat the two groups separately.
Costs are computed by learning the behavior of P&Ps through direct questionnaires and surveys.
25The social-cost impact of casino-related serious problem gamblers was $138,453,113. Dividing this by the
number of adults over 20 in the counties with casinos gives the per adult ﬁgure in the text. The proportion of
costs due to police, theft, and judicial-related costs is determined from their tables A-2 and A-5.
26Research for the NGISC estimated that average losses by adults living near a casino might be in the $400-$600
range per year. Other estimates, including some by the gambling industry for losses by residents in Las Vegas and
Atlantic City to casinos are lower than $400, even after adjusting upward for price level changes.
27In Illinois the average tax rate rises from 43 to 50 percent as casino annual gross revenues rises from $250-$340
million. Revenues this large imply a very successful casino.
28This observation is due to the anonymous referee. Whether casinos expand, shrink, or disappear will be
immaterial because whatever outcome occurs will be the result of socially optimal decisions by the ﬁrms themselves.
25VI. Do Casinos Simply Attract Crime from Elsewhere?
The estimates suggest that after ﬁve years, 8.6 percent of the observed property crime and 12.6
percent of the violent crime in casino counties are due to casinos.29 However, do casinos create
crime, or merely move it from elsewhere? If the casino-induced increases in crime come only from
neighboring regions, casinos produce no new crime. This untested hypothesis is ﬁrst tested here.
To address this question we examine the crime rates of counties that border casino counties.
When casinos open, neighboring county crime rates could either decrease, remain the same, or
increase. The ﬁrst possibility supports the idea that casinos move crime from adjacent counties
but do not create crime. In the second and third cases, adjacent counties experience no change
or an increase in crime, both of which indicate that total crime rises and that casinos create
crime.
To implement a test strategy we re-estimate the Table 4 regressions with neighbor leads and
lags as additional control variables. We deﬁne the neighbor lead, opening and lag variables,
similar to those in Tables 3 and 4 for the host county. The “neighbor opening” variable took
a value of 1 if a casino opened in an adjacent county in the given year. Adjacent counties are
the relevant unit of measurement, because the vast majority of casino patrons come from the
local region surrounding the casino. For example, in Illinois over 92 percent of casino customers
come from within 75 miles (Gazel and Thompson, 1996). A few casinos, mainly in Nevada, draw
their customers from outside their immediate area. However, our estimates do not rely on these
casinos to identify the eﬀects, because these casinos opened prior to the beginning of our sample.
Figure 6 summarizes the estimated casino eﬀect for neighboring and home counties. When
the neighbor variables were included the host county crime coeﬃcients were virtually unchanged,
both in terms of point estimates and statistical signiﬁcance. For the years before casinos open,
there is virtually no impact of the casino on crime rates in neighboring counties. 32 of the 42
opening and post-opening coeﬃcient estimates on the neighbor variables are positive, 15 of which
are statistically signiﬁcant at the .05 level. 18 of 21 coeﬃcients for lags 3-5 are positive, 8 of
which are individually statistically signiﬁcant. None of the three negative coeﬀcients for lags 3-5
are statistically signiﬁcant. All crimes but murder display elevated and rising lags 3, 4, and 5.
For all oﬀense types the data reject the contention that the increase in crime in the casino
counties can be attributed to decreases in neighboring counties, and thus support the contention
that casinos create crime. F-tests reject at the 5% level for all crimes the hypothesis that
host county opening and lag coeﬃcient estimates are matched with negative estimates of equal
size in neighboring counties. On the contrary, a simple correlation of host and neighbor-county
29Section V.C explains the computation of these numbers.
26coeﬃcient estimates for opening and lags range from .61 to .82 with the exception of robbery
(.14). However, there is ambiguity about the extent to which casinos increase crime in neighbor
counties. Murder clearly exhibits no spillover eﬀects. For the other oﬀense types the neighbor
time pattern is similar to the home-county time pattern. Crime typically increases in later lags
but at half or less the magnitude of the home county eﬀect, and many of these neighbor county
eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant until the very last lags. F-tests of the proposition that
neighbor county coeﬃcient estimates equal their host county counterparts are rejected at the 5
percent level for aggravated assault, rape, robbery, and auto theft, but not for the other three
crimes.
Figure 6: Home and Neighbor Casino-Crime Eﬀects: Violent Crime Rates
In our discussion of host-county auto theft rates we speculated as to why the host-county
estimated coeﬃcients displayed a diﬀerent pattern of continually growing crime. This pattern of
host-county coeﬃcients did not appear closely related to the introduction of casinos. However,
auto theft for neighbor counties displays the pattern of crime increases observed for other crimes.
There is a statistically signiﬁcant, discernibly diﬀerent crime rate three or more years after the
opening of the neighboring casino, but not in the years before. The neighbor-county eﬀect
27Figure 7: Home and Neighbor Casino-Crime Eﬀects: Property Crime Rates
suggests possible spillover of auto theft crimes due to the casino.
VII. Conclusions
Our analysis of the relationship between casinos and crime is the most exhaustive ever undertaken
in terms of the number of regions examined, the years covered and the control variables used.
Using data from every US county from 1977 to 1996 and controlling for over 50 variables to
examine the impact of casinos on the seven FBI Index I crimes (murder, rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, burglary, larceny and auto theft), we concluded that casinos increased all crimes except
murder, the crime with the least obvious connection to casinos. Most oﬀenses showed that the
impact of casinos on crime increased over time, a pattern very consistent with the theories of how
casinos aﬀect crime. The crime-ameliorating eﬀects of casinos through increased employment
opportunities and wages for low-skilled people will be concentrated shortly after opening. Also, law
enforcement agencies can frequently use casino openings to leverage greater immediate staﬃng
increases, but are unable to sustain this growth. This eﬀect further reduces the immediate
28impact of casinos on crime. However, over time these eﬀects are dominated by casino-related
factors that increase crime. Speciﬁcally, problem and pathological gamblers commit crime as they
deplete their resources, nonresidents who visit casinos may both commit and be victims of crime,
and casino-induced changes in the population start small but grow. The data show that these
crime-inducing and crime-mitigating eﬀects oﬀset each other shortly after opening, but over time
the crime-raising eﬀects dominate, and crime increases in subsequent years. Furthermore, we
believe these estimates to be lower bounds on the true eﬀect because they omit measures of law
enforcement, which is typically increased substantially when casinos open. When we include law
enforcement measures the estimated eﬀects are larger.
According to the estimates, between 5.5 and 30 percent of the diﬀerent crimes in casino
counties can be attributed to casinos. This translates into a social crime cost associated with
casinos of $75 per adult in 1996. This ﬁgure does not include other social costs related to casinos,
such as crime in neighboring counties, direct regulatory costs, costs related to employment and
lost productivity, social service and welfare costs. Overall, 8.6 percent of property crime and 12.6
percent of violent crime in counties with casinos was due to the presence of the casino. Although
robbery, the oﬀense that exhibited the largest increase, is classiﬁed as a violent crime, it is more
appropriately classiﬁed as a property crime in that its motivation is ﬁnancial.
We also investigated whether the crime in casino counties is attracted (moved) from other
regions or is created. Counties that neighbor casino counties did not experience compensating
crime reductions, indicating that crime was created in casino counties, rather than simply being
shifted from one area to another. There is mixed evidence about whether casino openings increase
neighbor county crime rates. Murder rates in neighbor counties are unaﬀected. The other oﬀenses
exhibit increasing neighbor crime rates, but are generally not statistically signiﬁcant until the
fourth and ﬁfth year after opening.
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